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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 In 1953, Theodor Seuss Geisel—more commonly known by his pen name “Dr. 
Seuss”—published a one-page poem, coupled with a single illustration, entitled “The 
Sneetches,” in Redbook magazine.1 The story was about two groups of birds living on 
the beaches of the mythical land of Aw-Waw Hoo: the Star-Belly Sneetches—who 
had stars on their bellies—and the Plain-Belly Sneetches—who did not.2 The story 
made clear that—save for those small stars—the two groups of Sneetches were 
identical, but that the Star-Belly Sneetches believed their stars made them superior. 
As a result, the Star-Belly Sneetches excluded the Plain-Belly Sneetches from their 
social activities, provoking an angry response from the latter.3
 In 1961, Seuss revised the story and published it with other stories in book form.4 
This expanded version of the story differed in several important ways from the original. 
First, the Sneetches were no longer identified as birds from the mythical land of 
Aw-Waw Hoo, but were instead depicted as more people-like creatures who “could be 
from anywhere,” both indicating the universality of the story and drawing a closer 
nexus between the story and human behavior.5 Second, in the original story each of the 
two groups of Sneetches were depicted (in pictures and in words) as “equally haughty” 
to the other, while in the 1961 version the social stratification between the two groups 
was clear, with the mood of the Plain-Belly Sneetches changed from anger to dejection.6 
Third, the 1961 version introduced a new character, Sylvester McMonkey McBean, 
who approached the dejected Plain-Belly Sneetches and offered to use his special 
machine to put stars on their bellies for a fee, which they all promptly did, making 
them indistinguishable from the Star-Belly Sneetches. This development greatly upset 
the original Star-Belly Sneetches, who continued to believe they were superior, but 
could no longer easily distinguish themselves from the “inferior” Plain-Belly Sneetches.7 
McBean then offered to remove the stars from the original Star-Belly Sneetches so 
they could once again distinguish themselves from the original Plain-Belly Sneetches. 
This cycle of removing and affixing stars on the bellies of the Sneetches continued 
until they had spent all of their money and gone through the machines so many times 
that they were no longer sure who was who.8 Finally, although the original version of 
the story ended in a standoff between the two groups, with no resolution of the 
1. Dr. Seuss, The Sneetches, Redbook, July 1953, at 77.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Dr. Seuss, The Sneetches, in The Sneetches and Other Stories (1961).
5. See Tales for Little Rebels 208 (Julia L. Mickenberg & Philip Nel eds., 2008).
6. See Charles D. Cohen, The Seuss the Whole Seuss and Nothing but the Seuss: A Visual 
Biography of Theodor Seuss Geisel 309 (Random House 2004).
7. Id.
8. See The Sneetches, supra note 4.
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prejudice, the 1961 version ended happily, with the Sneetches ultimately reconciling 
and agreeing “that Sneetches are Sneetches.”9
 Since The Sneetches was published, different minority groups, particularly Jews10 
and African Americans,11 have used the story as an allegory for discriminatory 
treatment suffered at the hands of the majority. Indeed, there is conflicting evidence 
about whether the story was intended by Seuss as a commentary on the treatment of 
Jews during the Holocaust or instead on the treatment of African Americans during 
the civil rights struggle of the 1950s and 1960s.12 The date when each version of The 
Sneetches was published—coupled with the substantive changes made to the story—
provides strong evidence that it was a story about the civil rights struggle of African 
Americans. This makes sense, because the original version of the story was published 
while Brown v. Board of Education was winding its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and the 1961 version was published well after that decision had created at least 
somewhat of a “happy ending,”13 which is consistent with the happy ending added to 
the second version of The Sneetches.
 However, it is perhaps because the theme of discrimination by the majority against 
minority groups is universal in nature that the story works as an anti-Holocaust allegory 
even if inspired by opposition to racism against African Americans,14 and vice versa.15 
Indeed, The Sneetches has been invoked as an allegory for other circumstances such as 
the ethnic war in Bosnia16 and the discrimination experienced by shorter children.17 
Moreover, both the original and 1961 versions of the story help explain maturing civil 
rights battles, because they represent different phases in that maturation process.
9. See id.; Tales for Little Rebels, supra note 5, at 208.
10. See, e.g., Dinitia Smith, Bestowing a Moral Imagination on a World of Children, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 
2004, at A3, available at http://nyti.ms/1f0ytXe.
11. See, e.g., Earnest N. Bracey, American Popular Culture and the Politics of Race in Dr. Seuss’ The 
Sneetches, in On Racism: Essays on Black Popular Culture, African American Politics, and 
the New Black Aesthetics 81, 81–88 (2003).
12. Compare Jonathan Cott, The Good Dr. Seuss, in Of Sneetches and Whos and the Good Dr. Seuss: 
Essays on the Writings and Life of Theodor Geisel 99, 118 (Thomas Fensch ed., 1997) (noting 
that, in an interview, Seuss indicated that the story “was inspired by my opposition to anti-Semitism”), 
with Walter C. Metz, “Show Me the Shoah!”: Generic Experience and Spectatorship in Popular Representations 
of the Holocaust, 27 Shofar: Interdisc. J. Jewish Stud. 16, 29–31 (2008) (providing evidence that Seuss 
was surprised when someone indicated to him that the Star-Belly Sneetches would remind people of the 
Holocaust, and concluding that it was instead inspired by discrimination against African Americans), and 
Judith Morgan & Neil Morgan, Dr. Seuss & Mr. Geisel: A Biography 173–74 (1995) (noting that 
Seuss nearly abandoned the book after someone told him he thought the story was anti-Semitic, suggesting 
that Seuss had not necessarily focused in on it as a book about discrimination against Jews).
13. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 219.
14. See Metz, supra note 12, at 30.
15. See Philip Nel, Dr. Seuss: American Icon 59 (Continuum Int’l Publ’g Grp. 2004) (2003).
16. See Irene Tucker, The Moment of Racial Sight: A History 1 (2012); Seuss Stories Will Be Used to 
Foster Tolerance in Bosnia, Reading Today, Oct./Nov. 1998, at 7.
17. See Basil J. Zitelli, Sneetches and Growth Hormone, 140 J. Pediatrics 493, 493–95 (2002).
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 In this essay, I invoke both versions of The Sneetches as an allegory for the modern 
struggle for gay18 rights in the United States viewed through three different prisms. 
The first and most obvious of these prisms is the battle between the heterosexual 
majority and the gay minority represented by the two groups of Sneetches. Members 
of the majority seek to distinguish themselves with markers of social acceptance such 
as marriage, parenting, and military service, as well as access to certain other markers 
of social acceptance, including the ability to donate blood and become members in 
private organizations such as the Boy Scouts.
 The second prism is the struggle between two different minority groups—gays and 
African Americans—with members of the latter group rejecting the former’s efforts to 
draw analogies to its own civil rights struggle. Finally, the third prism is the struggle 
between two different sub-groups within the gay minority: assimilationists and non-
conformists. The latter is critical of what it views as the former’s insecurity in seeking 
mere formal equality by erasing valuable differences that set gays apart. Indeed, in this 
last struggle, some non-conformists have come out against the rights of gays to marry 
or serve in the military.
 Part II of this essay provides an overview of Social Dominance Theory, which 
posits that humans are psychologically predisposed to develop and maintain group-
based social hierarchies. Part III uses The Sneetches and the insights of Social 
Dominance Theory as a way of explaining the first prism—the struggle between the 
heterosexual majority and gay minority. Parts IV and V use these tools to explain, 
respectively, the second prism—the struggle between African Americans and the gay 
community, and the third prism—the struggle between assimilationists and non-
conformists within the gay community. Part VI explores the question of who in the 
battle over gay rights is represented by Seuss’s Sylvester McMonkey McBean.
 In this essay, I demonstrate that as one changes focus from the main story about 
the struggle for gay rights (the first prism) to the stories of the two sub-battles within 
that struggle (the second and third prisms), the groups represented by the Star-Belly 
and Plain-Belly Sneetches change on a superficial level. Yet, on a deeper level, I 
demonstrate that each group involved in these struggles—African Americans, 
assimilationist gays, and non-conformist gays—simultaneously internalizes the 
discriminatory impulses of the Star-Belly Sneetches and the insecurities of the Plain-
Belly Sneetches. Relying on the insights of Social Dominance Theory, I conclude that 
The Sneetches is not merely a story about a struggle between different classes within 
society, but also about a struggle within each of us as individuals. These insights 
provide each side in the battle over gay rights with a reason to further reflect upon 
possible subconscious motivations for both its positions and its methods of advocacy, 
and to reconsider both in light of those reflections.
ii. thE insights Of sOCiaL dOMinanCE thEOrY
 In considering why it may be so important for the Star-Belly Sneetches to 
differentiate themselves from the Plain-Belly Sneetches—and in turn, to better 
18. In this article, I will use the term “gay” to mean “lesbian” as well.
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understand the struggle for gay rights in the United States—it is instructive to 
consider the insights of Social Dominance Theory.19
 This theory posits that humans are psychologically predisposed to develop and 
maintain group-based social hierarchies.20 The basic structure of all such hierarchical 
systems includes a dominant group at the top and a “negative reference group” at the 
bottom.21 The dominant group is characterized by its possession of the lion’s share of 
“positive social value,” consisting of “all those material and symbolic things for which 
people strive.”22 The negative reference group is defined by its possession of a 
disproportionate share of “negative social value,” which includes “low power and 
status” as well as “severe negative sanctions.”23 The hierarchy is typically based on 
arbitrary, socially constructed characteristics.24
 Such group-based social hierarchies are developed through individual and 
institutional discrimination, as well as through “hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing 
myths” coupled with “behavioral asymmetry” between the dominant and subordinate 
groups.25
 “Hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths” refer to values, beliefs, and stereotypes 
that provide moral and intellectual justification for maintaining or increasing levels of 
inequality among social groups.26 “Behavioral asymmetry” refers to the difference in 
behavior between those in the dominant and subordinate groups, which manifests 
itself in two key ways. First, those in the dominant group possess a high degree of 
in-group favoritism whereas those in the subordinate groups are more likely to possess 
out-group favoritism, or a preference for the dominant group over their own group.27 
The “famous doll experiment” cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education28—in which black children demonstrated a preference for white dolls over 
black dolls—is a classic example of behavioral asymmetry.29 Second, those in the 
subordinate groups tend to adopt negative stereotypes as behavioral scripts, and thus 
engage in self-destructive behavior that is used to justify continued social stratification.30 
Moreover, those within the subordinate group who seek to break from those stereotypes 
19. See generally Jim Sidanius & Felicia Pratto, Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of 
Social Hierarchy and Oppression (2001).
20. See id. at 38, 56, 301.
21. See id. at 31; Jim Sidanius, Erik Devereux & Felicia Pratto, A Comparison of Symbolic Racism Theory and 
Social Dominance Theory as Explanations for Racial Policy Attitudes, 132(3) J. Soc. Psychol. 377, 379 (1992).
22. Sidanius & Pratto, supra note 19, at 31. 
23. Id. at 32.
24. See id. at 33. 
25. See id. at 39, 43, 45–46.
26. See id. at 45–47, 104–05.
27. See id. at 44, 228.
28. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
29. See Sidanius & Pratto, supra note 19, at 228.
30. See id. at 44, 260–61.
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sometimes face pressure from others within the group who accuse them of in-group 
disloyalty such as “trying to act White,” a concept known as “oppositional identity.”31
 Another aspect of Social Dominance Theory is worth emphasizing. The impulse 
to reinforce and reproduce hierarchical social structures is not limited to those in the 
dominant group. Those in the subordinate groups likewise seek to establish their 
supremacy over other subordinate groups so that they, too, can have a “negative 
reference group” below them.32
 Much of what this theory teaches about human behavior can be found in the 
1961 version of The Sneetches. First, there is a social hierarchy in the story, with the 
Star-Belly Sneetches as the dominant group and the Plain-Belly Sneetches as the 
negative reference group. Second, the classification is based on an arbitrary and 
socially constructed characteristic: whether Sneetches have stars on their bellies. 
This arbitrary classification is evidenced by the original Star-Belly Sneetches’ ability 
to turn around and declare the absence of a star to be the acid test for superiority.33 
Third, the hierarchy is reinforced by the original Star-Belly Sneetches, who tell 
legitimizing myths about the inferiority of the Plain-Belly Sneetches to one another, 
to their children, and to the Plain-Belly Sneetches. Fourth, there is behavioral 
asymmetry between the two groups of Sneetches, with the original Star-Belly 
Sneetches displaying a high degree of in-group favoritism and the original Plain-
Belly Sneetches displaying a strong desire to be more like the dominant out-group. 
In turn, much of what is found in the 1961 version of The Sneetches can be found in 
the story of the struggle for gay rights in the United States. It is to that story—with 
the insights of Social Dominance Theory in mind—that this essay now turns.
iii. hEtErOsEXUaL snEEtChEs VErsUs gaY snEEtChEs
If marriage rights carry the presumption that gay and straight marriages 
are morally equivalent, then individuals cannot bracket the question of 
homosexuality’s moral status . . . . If heterosexuals share ownership of 
marriage with “ inferior” homosexual couples, then the institution’s value 
as a signifier of status declines.34
 In The Sneetches, Seuss remarks that, given how small the stars on the Star-Belly 
Sneetches are, “[y]ou might think such a thing wouldn’t matter at all.”35 Yet he then 
goes on to demonstrate how the Star-Belly Sneetches took this one difference and 
made it the sine qua non of what it means to be a Sneetch, using it to justify excluding 
the Plain-Belly Sneetches from such important Sneetch social functions as “frankfurter 
31. See id. at 181, 259.
32. See id. at 52–53, 232–33, 302.
33. See The Sneetches, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
34. Gary Mucciaroni, Same Sex, Different Politics: Success and Failure in the Struggles Over 
Gay Rights 26 (2008).
35. The Sneetches, supra note 4.
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roasts  .  .  . or marshmallow toasts.”36 Similarly, in the United States, members of the 
heterosexual majority have taken the one difference37 between themselves and gays and 
used it to justify denying the latter markers of social acceptance.
 Unlike the stars on the bellies of Sneetches, sexual orientation is not readily 
apparent, but becomes visible only when someone seeks to express that orientation.38 
For this reason, the heterosexual majority has created visible markers akin to the stars 
of the Star-Belly Sneetches as a way of differentiating it from the gay minority, and has 
enacted laws designed to prevent the latter from having those markers. For example, 
gays have been excluded from marriage (wedding rings and marriage licenses),39 service 
in the military (uniforms and badges),40 parenting (children),41 the ability to donate 
blood (stickers that read “be nice to me I gave blood today”),42 and from participation 
in organizations such as the Boy Scouts (uniforms and badges).43 These markers of 
social acceptance serve double duty as analogies for both the “stars” the Plain-Belly 
Sneetches are denied and the “frankfurter roasts  .  .  . or marshmallow toasts” from 
which they are excluded.
 Moreover, as gays have achieved some success in challenging such laws in the 
judicial and legislative arenas, they have been met with new methods of differentiating 
gays from the rest of society. For example, when state courts began to hold that equal 
36. See id. at 7.
37. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (“Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of 
judicial review. It is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies 
them protection across the board.”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 
2003) (“The ‘marriage is procreation’ argument singles out the one unbridgeable difference between same-
sex and opposite-sex couples, and transforms that difference into the essence of legal marriage.”).
38. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 183–84 (2d Cir. 2012), aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
39. See, e.g., Ga. Const. art. 1, § 4, ¶ I(a) (“This state shall recognize as marriage only the union of man 
and woman. Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this state.”); 23 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 1704 (West 1996) (“It is hereby declared to be the strong and longstanding public policy 
of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one woman. A marriage between 
persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid 
where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.”).
40. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (2010) (“A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed 
forces . . . if . . . [t]he member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage in 
a homosexual act or acts . . . .”), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-321, 
§ 2(f)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 3515, 3516 (2010).
41. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.042(3) (West 2003) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute may 
adopt if that person is a homosexual.”), invalidated by Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of 
X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2013) (“Adoption 
by couples of the same gender is prohibited.”).
42. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Blood Donations from Men Who Have Sex with Other Men Questions and 
Answers, http://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/bloodbloodproducts/questionsaboutblood/ucm108186.
htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) (“Men who have had sex with other men . . . at any time since 1977 . . . 
are currently deferred as blood donors.”).
43. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts have a First Amendment 
right to exclude gay youth and adults from their organization); Boy Scouts of America Equal Access Act, 
20 U.S.C. § 7905 (2013).
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protection and due process principles found in their state constitutions required 
legislators to extend the rights, responsibilities, and privileges associated with 
marriage to gay couples,44 legislatures responded by creating alternatives to marriage 
for same-sex couples—such as domestic partnerships and civil unions—that allowed 
continued differentiation.45 Moreover, even as gays achieved success in persuading 
state courts and state legislatures to grant them the right to marry,46 those marriages 
were given limited effect as a result of the enactment of the unprecedented47 Defense 
of Marriage Act,48 which denied federal recognition of such marriages49 and excused 
sister states from recognizing such marriages,50 thus differentiating “real marriages” 
from, say, “Massachusetts Marriages.” A similar volley has taken place over anti-
discrimination laws, with legislative and judicial victories being countered with 
statutory51 and constitutional52 exemptions from such laws.
 In The Sneetches, Seuss focuses on the impact that the Star-Belly Sneetches’ 
discriminatory conduct has on the adult Plain-Belly Sneetches’ children, too. He 
writes, “When the Star-Belly Children went out to play ball, / Could a Plain Belly 
get in the game . . . ? Not at all.”53 In much the same way, the collateral consequences 
44. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 
864 (Vt. 1999); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
45. See, e.g., 2000 Vt. Laws P.A. 91 (H. 847) (codified as amended at Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1201–07 
(West 2013)) (extending all of the rights, responsibilities, and privileges of marriage to same-sex 
couples, but using the label “civil unions”); 1997 Hawaii Laws Act 383 (H.B. 118) (codified as 
amended at Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572c-1–572c-7 (West 2013)) (creating a limited domestic partnership 
registry); see also Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) (holding that a 
proposal by the Massachusetts legislature that would extend all of the rights, responsibilities, and 
privileges of marriage to same-sex couples using the label “civil unions” would not satisfy the 
requirements of the Massachusetts Constitution).
46. See, e.g., 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 95 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-a–10-b 
(McKinney 2014)); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
47. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 186 (2d Cir. 2012), aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Massachusetts 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012); In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925, 933 
(9th Cir. 2009); Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 872 F. Supp. 2d 944, 956–57 (N.D. Cal. 2012); 
Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
48. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104–99, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996); 28 
U.S.C. § 1738 (1996)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
49. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
51. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b (McKinney 2014) (creating a religious exception to the state’s 
public accommodation laws allowing businesses to refuse to “provide services, accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration of a marriage”).
52. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts have a First 
Amendment right to exclude gays, state anti-discrimination laws to the contrary notwithstanding).
53. See The Sneetches, supra note 4.
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that discrimination against gays has on their children has been a recurring theme in 
litigation involving same-sex marriage54 and same-sex parenting.55
 As indicated in the opening quote in this Part, supporters of such restrictive laws 
view marriage and the other markers of social acceptance used to differentiate gays 
from heterosexuals as ways of signaling the lower social worth of the latter vis-à-vis 
the former. Allowing gays to display such markers of social acceptance would—in 
the view of some—dilute the value of those markers:
The use of the symbolic associations that accompany the word “marriage” by 
same-sex couples arguably would have the same diluting effect upon the 
meaning of traditional marriage as the use of “Exxon” on different products 
and services would.56
 Just as The Sneetches can be viewed through the lens of Social Dominance Theory, 
so too can the battle for gay rights. First, the heterosexual majority has historically 
invoked “legitimizing myths” to justify discrimination against gays. For example, gay 
men are characterized as “promiscuous,” a characterization that has been used to 
justify their exclusion from marriage,57 blood donation,58 and lawful sexual activity.59 
Similarly, they are characterized as sexually “predatory,” a characterization that has 
been used to justify their exclusion from service in the military60 and membership in 
the Boy Scouts.61 Second, some gay men engage in promiscuous sexual conduct—
behavior that many advocates of legalizing same-sex marriage view as a byproduct of 
the refusal to accord formal recognition to same-sex relationships62—thus fulfilling 
54. See, e.g., Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 966, 1003 (D. Nev. 2012) (noting that complaint alleges 
“children [of same-sex couples] suffer both tangible and dignitary harms”); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. 
Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 335–36 (D. Conn. 2012); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. 
Supp. 2d 968, 992–93 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 474–75 
(Conn. 2008); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 425 (Cal. 2008); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 
648 (Md. 2007) (Raker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 
216–17 (N.J. 2006); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1018–19 (Wash. 2006) (Fairhurst, J., 
dissenting); Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 379 (2006); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 963–64 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 882 (Vt. 1999).
55. See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 568–69 (Cal. 2003); In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 658 
(1995).
56. David Crump, The Dilution Problem and Other Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage: How Persuasive 
Are They?, 9 Ave Maria L. Rev. 221, 235–36 (2011).
57. See George W. Dent, No Difference? An Analysis of Same-Sex Parenting, 10 Ave Maria L. Rev. 53, 64 
(2011); Lynn D. Wardle, A Response to the “Conservative Case” for Same-Sex Marriage: Same-Sex Marriage 
and “The Tragedy of the Commons”, 22 BYU J. Pub. L. 441, 455–60 (2008). 
58. See Michael Christian Belli, The Constitutionality of the “Men Who Have Sex With Men” Blood Donor 
Exclusion Policy, 4 J.L. Soc’y 315, 368 (2003).
59. See State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 512–13 (Mo. 1986).
60. See Heather S. Ingrum Gipson, “The Fight for the Right to Fight”: Equal Protection & The United States 
Military, 74 UMKC L. Rev. 383, 405–06 (2005).
61. See Stephen Clark, Judicially Straight? Boy Scouts v. Dale and the Missing Scalia Dissent, 76 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 521, 557 n.177 (2003).
62. See generally Andrew Sullivan, The Marriage Moment, Advocate, at 60–63 (Jan. 20, 1998).
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the stereotype, or “behavioral asymmetry,” used to justify continued discrimination 
against them. Finally, as will be discussed below, Social Dominance Theory helps 
explain the side-battles in the fight for gay marriage taking place between gays and 
African Americans, as well as within the gay community.
iV. afriCan aMEriCan snEEtChEs VErsUs gaY snEEtChEs
 Please stop carpet-bagging on our civil rights movement63
 The current battle over marriage rights for gay couples is not the first time laws 
regulating marriage have been used by the majority to differentiate socially worthy and 
socially unworthy couplings. It is preceded by a long history of not merely prohibiting 
but also criminalizing interracial marriage. It was not until 1967 that the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in Loving v. Virginia,64 declared such laws to be unconstitutional.
 In Loving, the Court found the state’s miscegenation laws to be constitutionally 
infirm for two reasons. First, the Court held that the laws—by drawing distinctions 
based on the race of the individuals involved—constituted race discrimination, thus 
subjecting them to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause, which they did 
not satisfy.65 Second, the laws interfered with the “fundamental” right to marry 
protected by the due process clause.66
 It is no surprise that advocates of same-sex marriage have invoked Loving to 
challenge laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, as Loving provides several independent 
bases for challenging such laws. First, one can challenge such laws on the ground that 
they constitute sex discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause. The 
Loving Court held that although laws banning interracial marriage were applied 
equally to whites and non-whites, the laws drew race-based classifications and were 
therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Similarly, although laws banning same-sex marriage 
are applied equally to men and women, the laws draw sex-based classifications and 
should therefore be subject to heightened scrutiny.67 Second, one can challenge such 
laws on the ground that they constitute sexual orientation discrimination, and can 
draw analogies between race-based and sexual orientation-based discrimination to 
argue for heightened equal protection scrutiny.68 Third, one can challenge such laws on 
63. Ben Neary, Wyoming House Panel Advances Domestic Partnerships, Associated Press (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/wyo-lawmakers-see-movement-gay-rights-issues (quoting Lynn 
Hutchings, an African American member of the Wyoming legislature, commenting on a proposed bill 
to legalize same-sex marriage).
64. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
65. Id. at 7–12.
66. Id. at 12.
67. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970–71 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J., 
concurring); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 906 (Vt. 1998) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67–68 (Haw. 1993).
68. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 440–44 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 
957 A.2d 407, 431–61 (Conn. 2008).
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the ground that, just like the miscegenation laws, bans on same-sex marriage interfere 
with the fundamental right to marry as protected by the due process clause.69
 When gays invoke the “Loving analogy”70 in the legal and political spheres, they 
sometimes receive an angry response from some members of the African American 
community. For example, during a 2013 debate in the Wyoming legislature over two 
bills—one to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples and another to create a 
parallel domestic partnership scheme—Lynn Hutchings, an African American 
member of the Wyoming legislature, responded to what she described as efforts by 
gays to equate their struggle for civil rights to that of mixed-race couples in the 1960s 
with a plea to “stop carpet-bagging on our civil rights movement.”71
 To be sure, Ms. Hutchings does not represent the view of all, or even most, African 
Americans.72 Yet it is no secret that Ms. Hutchings’s view is shared by a significant 
number of people within the African American community, who—influenced by 
church leaders within their community—oppose both the drive for same-sex marriage 
and the efforts by gays to analogize the struggle for racial equality in the United States 
with gay equality. The objections raised by this segment of the African American 
community to the Loving analogy are threefold. First, they note the significant 
differences in the history between the two groups, pointing to the history of slavery, 
Jim Crow laws, and segregation, as well as the fact that interracial marriage was not 
merely unrecognized but actually criminalized.73 Second, they distinguish the innate 
nature of race from what they perceive to be the volitional or behavioral nature of 
homosexuality.74 And third, they draw attention to the difference in the visibility of the 
traits of homosexuality and race respectively, noting that “[h]omosexual orientation is 
not necessarily visible but ‘[r]ace is never invisible.’”75
69. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 419–34.
70. See generally David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of 
Analogy, 12 BYU J. Pub. L. 201 (1998).
71. Neary, supra note 63.
72. Recently, numerous prominent leaders within the African American community, including President 
Barack Obama, have come out in favor of same-sex marriage. African American voters—who traditionally 
have been one of the voting blocs most likely to oppose same-sex marriage—have recently come closer to 
mirroring the split in the general population on the issue. Perhaps the most striking symbol of African 
American support for the right to same-sex marriage is a statement issued by Mildred Loving—the 
African American woman who brought the legal challenge that bears her name. On the fortieth 
anniversary of the Loving decision, Loving expressed her support of the right of same-sex couples to 
marry, writing, “That’s what Loving, and loving, are all about.” See Mildred Loving, Loving for All: 
Prepared for Delivery on June 12, 2007, the 40th Anniversary of the Loving v. Virginia Announcement, 
available at http://www.freedomtomarry.org/page/-/files/pdfs/mildred_loving-statement.pdf.
73. See Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the “Loving Analogy” for 
Same-Sex Marriage, 51 How. L.J. 117, 144–45 (2007); Chandan Reddy, Time for Rights? Loving, Gay 
Marriage, and the Limits of Legal Justice, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2849, 2851, 2863–64 (2008).
74. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 873, 879–80 (2006).
75. See id. at 881–82. Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 73, at 146 (quoting Chelsea Jennings, Gay Rights Civil 
Rights: Comparing the Fight for Gay Equality to the Civil Rights Movement Glosses over Unique Experience
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 Race is the most obvious example of a visible characteristic, and in deciding 
whether to apply heightened scrutiny to other types of classifications, the Court has 
frequently drawn analogies to race. For example, the Court has held that “[g]ender, 
like race, is a highly visible and immutable characteristic that has historically been 
the touchstone for pervasive but often subtle discrimination.”76 Indeed, the Court has 
held that the absence of “an obvious badge” militates against applying heightened 
scrutiny,77 and a number of lower courts have followed suit, noting that “homosexuals 
generally are not identifiable ‘on sight’ unless they elect to be so identifiable by 
conduct (such as public displays of homosexual affection or self-proclamation of 
homosexual tendencies).”78
 In arguing for constitutional protection, African Americans and other minority 
groups experience the struggles of both the Star-Belly and the Plain-Belly Sneetches. 
 of African Americans, SodaHead (May 25, 2006), http://www.sodahead.com/united-states/gay-rights-
civil-rights/blog-18050/?link=ibaf&q=&esrc=s. These three objections track three of the factors that 
the U.S. Supreme Court has identified in deciding whether to accord heightened scrutiny to a given 
classification under the equal protection clause. First, the Court has identified a history of discrimination 
as one of the key considerations in deciding whether to accord heightened scrutiny. See Bowen v. 
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); Lyng v. 
Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–85 (1973) (plurality opinion). In addition, the objection 
based on the differential history—and specifically the history of slavery—is relevant to the power of 
Congress to enact legislation prohibiting private discrimination pursuant to Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, under which Congress can enact legislation designed to eradicate the “badges and 
incidents of slavery.” See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 124–25 (1981); Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). Second, the Court 
has viewed as a relevant consideration the question whether the characteristics that define the group are 
immutable and determined merely by the accident of birth. See Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602; Lyng, 477 U.S. 
at 638; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. Third, the Court has held that the question whether the trait that 
defines a group are “obvious” or “visible” is pertinent in deciding whether to apply heightened scrutiny 
to laws that discriminate against that group. See Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602; Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638; 
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (“[I]n part because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still 
face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination . . . .”); United States v. Carolene Prods. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (indicating that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” is a 
condition calling for “more searching judicial inquiry”) (emphasis added).
76. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979). 
77. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976).
78. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated 
on other grounds, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996); see also Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1011 (D. Nev. 
2012) (“[T]he continued discrimination against women in 1973 was largely due to the high visibility of the 
sex characteristic, a visibility that the characteristic of homosexuality does not have to nearly the same 
extent as gender.”); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1991) (“Even if it were maintained that 
his sexual preference for men was a distinguishing characteristic, nothing in the record indicates that the 
plaintiff overtly ‘exhibited’ such a characteristic. In fact, he kept his sexual preference secret . . . .”), aff ’d, 
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But see Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 183 (2d Cir. 
2012), aff ’d, Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (noting that many of the categories for 
which heightened scrutiny is applied—including “alienage, illegitimacy, and national origin”—involve 
“characteristics [that] do not declare themselves, and often may be disclosed or suppressed as a matter of 
preference,” and concluding that “[w]hat seems to matter is whether the characteristic of the class calls 
down discrimination when it is manifest”).
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In order to obtain heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause they must 
point to the visibility of the trait that defines the minority group, and therefore, like 
the Star-Belly Sneetches, African Americans and gays draw attention to the visible 
“stars” on their bellies.79 However, although African Americans, gays, and members 
of other minority groups seek to point to the visible differences between themselves 
and the majority as a means of seeking the protections of the equal protection clause, 
many also wish to eradicate or mask those differences. Therefore, like the Plain-
Belly Sneetches, the story of The Sneetches also highlights the willingness of members 
of minority groups to suppress their differences to fit in:
Too often, the anger and depression associated with being a member of the 
out-group becomes desperation to join the privileged, even if it means 
forgetting (or despising) what we are .  .  .  . Some turn to skin lighteners or 
plastic surgeries, while others attempt to purge their accents or deny their 
sexual preferences . . . .80
 Thus, The Sneetches represents the dual tension faced by members of minority 
communities. In order to obtain the protections of the legal system, they must point 
to the very differences that are the source of discrimination against them, but their 
desire to fit in also causes them to minimize and even erase those differences. The 
Sneetches’ repeated visits to McBean’s machine illustrate the competing internal 
tensions faced by members of minority communities.
 Although this peculiarity of U.S. constitutional law explains why African 
Americans might want to point to the presence of their “stars,” the same rationale 
does not explain why some African Americans might want to point out the absence of 
such “stars” in other minority groups, such as gays. Race is firmly established as a 
classification subject to strict scrutiny review under the equal protection clause, and 
the application of that heightened scrutiny to other classifications would not diminish 
the legal claims of African Americans.81
 Social Dominance Theory partially resolves that aspect of the tension between 
the African American and gay communities. As explained above, the impulse to 
reinforce and reproduce hierarchical social structures is not limited to those in the 
dominant group. Subordinate group members likewise seek to establish their 
supremacy over other subordinate groups so that they too can have a “negative 
reference group” below them. By reinforcing discriminatory legal schemes against 
gays, African Americans—who for so long have served as the “negative reference 
79. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183–84 (concluding that when same-sex couples seek to marry, they become 
“visible” for equal protection purposes).
80. Tanya Jeffcoat, From There to Here, from Here to There, Diversity is Everywhere, in Dr. Seuss and 
Philosophy: Oh, the Thinks You Can Think! 93, 93 (Jacob M. Held ed., 2011).
81. One caveat is that the Court’s switch from suspect classes to suspect classifications has diminished the legal 
interests of African Americans, as that switch has given Caucasians the ability to invoke strict scrutiny to 
challenge affirmative action programs. See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995). However, recognizing different classifications, such a sexual orientation, as suspect classifications 
would not diminish the legal interests of African Americans. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 
A.2d 407, 502 n.25 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J., dissenting).
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group” for other subordinate groups82— can arguably have their own negative reference 
group, allowing them to move up in the comparative social hierarchy.
 By supporting the denial of marriage and similar rights to gays, this segment of 
the African American community aligns itself with the “positive social value” 
associated with society’s dominant group, namely, Caucasians. Accordingly, this 
segment of the African American community internalizes aspects of both the Star-
Belly and Plain-Belly Sneetches, but in a different way than described above; they 
internalize the insecurities of the Plain-Belly Sneetches and the discriminatory 
impulses of the Star-Belly Sneetches, which together impel them to simultaneously 
align themselves more closely with the dominant group and to make gays their 
negative reference group.
 Social Dominance Theory applied in this context has much in common with 
“internalized racism” or “internalized oppression.”83 The latter posits that victims of 
majoritarian racism internalize that racism in three ways. First, the victims internalize 
the negative stereotypes about their own race created by the majority,84 or engage in 
“conscious and unconscious acceptance of a racial hierarchy in which whites are 
consistently ranked above People of Color.”85 As a result, minorities distance 
themselves from other members of their group who engage in what has been 
perpetuated by the majority as conduct or appearance stereotypically associated with 
that group.86 Second, those who break from some of the negative stereotypes 
attributed by the majority to their group—by performing well academically, for 
example, in the African American community—are accused by other members of 
their group of “trying to be white.”87 Third, they “introduce, tolerate, and proliferate” 
oppression of other oppressed groups.88
 The theory of internalized racism within the African American community 
provides an additional valuable insight regarding the particularly negative treatment 
experienced by those with an intersectional identity as both African American and 
gay. One of the legitimizing myths historically perpetuated to justify discrimination 
against African Americans has been to portray “black sexuality as ‘reckless, 
irresponsible, and dangerous.’”89 As Beverly Greene, a professor of psychology at St. 
John’s University, explains:
82. See Sidanius & Pratto, supra note 19, at 231–33.
83. See generally Suzanne Lipsky, Internalized Racism (Rational Island Publishers 1987).
84. See id. at 4–7.
85. Lindsay Perez Huber et al., Naming Racism: A Conceptualized Look at Internalized Racism in U.S. Schools, 
26 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 183, 184 (2006).
86. See Lipsky, supra note 83, at 5–6.
87. See id. at 8 (internal quotations omitted).
88. Id. at 11.
89. Beverly A. Greene, Heterosexism and Internalized Racism Among African Americans: The Connections and 
Considerations for African American Lesbians and Bisexual Women: A Clinical Psychological Perspective, 54 
Rutgers L. Rev. 931, 952 (2002). 
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 For African-Americans who have internalized the negative stereotypes of 
their sexuality, sexual behavior outside of dominant societal norms can be 
experienced as a negative ref lection on all African-Americans. There may be 
an exaggerated desire or pressure to model the behavior that appears normal 
to the dominant culture. . . .
 Because acceptance of lesbian sexual orientations is inconsistent with the 
dominant culture’s ideal, African American lesbians may be experienced as 
an embarrassment to African Americans who strongly identify with the 
dominant culture. . . .
 Homophobia allows African Americans who have internalized sexual/
racial stereotypes to distance themselves personally, and as a community, 
from the sexual stigma that the dominant culture has associated with Black 
identity, particularly stereotypes of Black sexuality. This distancing behavior 
allows some segments of the African American community to maintain their 
hope for legitimacy and full incorporation into the dominant culture’s power 
structure.90
 Neither Social Dominance Theory nor theories regarding internalized racism 
can fully explain the reasons why a significant number of African Americans oppose 
gay rights. “Heterosexism, like other forms of social prejudice, has multiple 
determinants,”91 and opposition to gay rights by African Americans can be explained 
by various other factors, such as the stronger religious orientation of African 
Americans and the inf luence of religion on their thinking.92 Nonetheless, Social 
Dominance Theory provides valuable insight that helps to explain at least one facet 
of the anti-gay views espoused by some African Americans.
V. gaY snEEtChEs VErsUs gaY snEEtChEs
The image of the good gay is never invoked without its shadow in mind—
the bad queer . . . .93
 Many outside of the gay community assume that high-profile battles, such as 
those over the rights of same-sex couples to marry and openly serve in the military, 
are supported by all gays. In fact, the battle within the gay community over these 
issues has been just as fierce, dividing it into two camps, which, for ease of discussion, 
will be referred to as assimilationist gays and non-conformist gays.
 Assimilationist gays believe that the best way to achieve equality is to eradicate 
formal discrimination by the government on the basis of sexual orientation, 
particularly the bans on same-sex marriage and open military service by gays.94 Once 
heterosexuals see that gays are “ just like them”—that they too fall in love, marry, and 
90. Id. at 953–54.
91. Id. at 932.
92. Id. at 947–49.
93. Michael Warner, Normal and Normaller: Beyond Gay Marriage, 5 GLQ 119, 131 (1999).
94. See Andrew Sullivan, Virtually Normal: An Argument About Homosexuality 169–87 
(Vintage Books 1996).
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serve as soldiers in the military—gays will be embraced as equals.95 Under the 
assimilationist gay approach, if marriage and serving in the military are analogous to 
the stars in The Sneetches, eliminating these legal barriers for gays means that some 
gays will have stars and some heterosexuals will not. We will thus arrive at the day 
when “neither the Plain nor the Star-Bellies [know] / Whether this one was that 
one . . . or that one was this one,” and we will have the happy ending from the 1961 
version of The Sneetches.96 In 1997, writer and editor Andrew Sullivan, a proponent of 
this view, declared that after achieving legalization of same-sex marriage “and a 
couple of other things  .  .  . we should have a party and close down the gay rights 
movement for good.”97
 In contrast, non-conformist gays have viewed the goal of the assimilationist gays 
as a fool’s errand, and have contended that no matter how much formal legal progress 
gays make, they will always be viewed as inferior by the heterosexual majority.98 
Although gays, like heterosexuals, would be able to marry, the presence or absence of 
the stars would still be evident, and in the minds of the majority there would always 
be marriage and “marriage.”
 Moreover, non-conformist gays contend that equality sought through assimilation 
comes at too high a cost.99 Non-conformists identify what they view as superior about 
gay culture—rejection of monogamy and more equitable relationship structures—and 
contend that marriage, an institution built on a history of subjugating women to 
men,100 is a vehicle for the state to impose monogamy. They further argue that this 
will destroy the positives of “queer” relationships such as lack of hierarchy and non-
exclusivity.101 Non-conformists, noting the history of state regulation of gay 
relationships via the sodomy laws, are also wary of re-inviting state regulation into the 
95. See id.
96. The Sneetches, supra note 4.
97. See Out Facts: Just About Everything You Need to Know About Gay and Lesbian Life 21 
(David Groff ed., 1997); accord Warner, supra note 93, at 158.
98. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in Lesbian and Gay Marriage: 
Private Commitments, Public Ceremonies 20, 26 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992) (“We must not 
fool ourselves into believing that marriage will make it acceptable to be gay or lesbian.”).
99. See Yuvraj Joshi, Respectiable Queerness, 43 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 415, 425 (2012) (“[Q ]ueer 
liberationists reject assimilation because of its normalizing costs . . . .”); Warner, supra note 93, at 122 (“If 
the campaign for marriage requires wholesale repudiation of queer culture’s best insights on intimate 
relations, sex, and the politics of stigma, then it is doing more harm than marriage could ever be worth.”).
100. Suzanna Danuta Walters, Take My Domestic Partner, Please: Gays and Marriage in the Era of the Visible, in 
Queer Families, Queer Politics: Challenging Culture and State 338, 347 (Mary Bernstein 
and Renate Reimann eds., 2001); Ettelbrick, supra note 98, at 20.
101. See Walters, supra note 100, at 348–49; Elizabeth Peel & Rosie Harding, Civil Partnerships: A New 
Couple’s Conversation, 14 Feminism & Psychol. 41, 42–43 (2004); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get 
What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of 
Gender in Every Marriage”, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1535, 1536 (1993) (stating that this type of assimilationist 
behavior “is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society”).
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sphere of their personal relationships via the marriage laws.102 Similarly, legalizing 
open service in the military comes at the high cost of supporting an aggressive U.S. 
military policy that those on the left generally oppose.103
 Non-conformists generally critique assimilationists for their efforts to merely 
“ape” or mimic the heterosexual majority.104 They view this as a character weakness, 
a degree of insecurity that results in a willingness to give up their true identity in 
exchange for social acceptance by the majority.105 Under the non-conformist view, 
the absence of a star is a good thing to be celebrated. The non-conformist vision 
reflects the original version of The Sneetches, in which the two groups of Sneetches 
were “equally haughty” to one another because each deemed itself superior to the 
other. Indeed, non-conformist gays and anti-gay activists have much in common, in 
that they both agree that gays are different. Representative of this view was Paula 
Ettelbrick, a prominent legal expert in the gay rights movement:
As a lesbian, I am fundamentally different from nonlesbian women. That’s 
the point. Marriage, as it exists today, is antithetical to my liberation as a 
lesbian and as a woman because it mainstreams my life and voice. I do not 
want to be known as “Mrs. Attached-To-Somebody-Else.” Nor do I want to 
give the state the power to regulate my primary relationship.106
 Yet perhaps the most interesting critique by the non-conformists is a concern that 
they will be marginilized if same-sex marriage is legalized. Non-conformists have 
argued that marriage would divide the gay community into two different groups: the 
“good gays” who marry, are monogamous, and raise a family, and the “bad queers” who 
do not fit that mold.107 Moreover, non-conformists believe that legalization of same-
102. See Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2685, 2685–89 (2008). See generally 
Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1399 (2004).
103. See generally Against Equality: Don’t Ask to Fight Their Wars (Ryan Conrad ed., 2011).
104. See John P. Elia, Queering Relationships: Toward a Paradigmatic Shift, 45 J. Homosexuality 61, 70, 77 
(2003); Peel & Harding, supra note 101.
105. See Joshi, supra note 99, at 417–22.
106. See Ettelbrick, supra note 98, at 22. Assimilationist gays don’t see things this way, and accuse non-
conformists of sharing the sins of the Star-Belly Sneetches: “By identifying as queer, lesbians and gay 
men do exactly the same thing that the most virulent homophobes do: they make their sexual orientation 
hyper-important, more important than any single factor should be in a complex human personality.” 
David Link, I Am Not Queer, in Beyond Queer: Challenging Gay Left Orthodoxy 266, 274 
(Bruce Bawer ed., 1996); see also Dale Carpenter, Straight Acting, 9 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 803, 808 
(2008) (“But note how the critique of straight acting, in its rejection of performance and straight 
identity, is itself encouraging a certain performance and constructing an identity.  .  .  . The critique of 
straight acting becomes a means of policing gay identity itself. Gay liberation becomes its own prison.”).
107. See Gayle S. Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in The Lesbian 
and Gay Studies Reader 3, 15 (1993) (“Most homosexuality is still on the bad side of the line.”); 
Walters, supra note 100, at 349 (“Gay marriage . . . might simply demonize nonmarried gays as the ‘bad 
gays’ (uncivilized, promiscuous, irresponsible) while it reluctantly embraces the ‘good gays’ who settle 
down and get married.”); Peel & Harding, supra note 101, at 42 (“What concerns me is that civil 
partnerships might become the yardstick against which all lesbian and gay relationships are judged. 
Other lesbian and gay relationship forms may be seen as less legitimate.”); Catherine Donovan, Why 
Reach for the Moon? Because the Stars Aren’t Enough, 14 Feminism & Psychol. 24, 24 (2004) (“I fear that 
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sex marriage will make it easier to deny the rights associated with marriage to 
unmarried same-sex pairings,108 pointing, for example, to the elimination of domestic 
partnership benefits in states that have legalized same-sex marriage.109
 By critiquing the legalization of marriage, non-conformist gays have the same 
insecurity that they accuse the assimilationist gays of having. Non-conformists 
express concerns about being marginalized by other gays and by society generally. 
They want to keep the respectable-looking gays—respectable-looking, that is, in the 
eyes of the heterosexual majority—in the “gay ghetto” with them because they 
recognize that they need them there to help lift everyone, including non-conformists, 
out of it. In other words, they recognize that nobody will advocate for the rights of 
unmarried, non-conformist gays once the assimilationist gays have obtained the right 
to marry.110 By opposing marriage rights for same-sex couples, non-conformists will 
force assimilationists to fight for rights for unmarried couples, thus helping non-
this strategy concedes a major part of the argument of the anti-same-sex-marriage-pro-sanctity-of-
heterosexual-marriage coalition: that other kinds of relationships do not have the same commitments, 
responsibilities, and value as those created in marriage.”); Jade McGleughlin & Sue Hyde, Can a 
Diamond Ever Be Gay?, 9 Stud. Gender & Sexuality 184, 190, 192 (2008) (“[L]egitimating certain 
kinds of unions surely delegitimates others . . . . We do not want to be the good gays cast against the 
ever more marginalized group that chooses (or has no choice about) other ways to live and love. And yet 
marriage does that.”).
108. See Elia, supra note 104, at 70–71 (“Aping heterosexual marriage is likely to afford gays and lesbians a 
modicum of societal approval and rewards more so than those with sexual minority status who do not fit 
the mold of the socially expected and authorized relationship construction (e.g., monogamous, long-
term, similar background, relationships). In essence, the respect, dignity, rewards and privileges 
afforded to non-heterosexuals are commensurate with how closely they approximate heteronormative 
practices.”) (citations omitted); Joshi, supra note 99, at 444–45 (“The state might, for example, point to 
married lesbians and gays as exemplary minorities whose integration into society should be commended, 
and censure non-married queers as failed minorities whose deviance from the norm should be 
condemned.  .  .  . By readjusting the parameters of unlawful (and lawful) discrimination, marriage 
equality may render discrimination claims by unmarried queers less legally cognizable, and even 
implicitly sanction discrimination against them.”); Warner, supra note 93, at 143 (“Squeezing gay 
couples into the legal sorting machine will only confirm the relevance of spousal status and leave 
unmarried queers looking more deviant before a legal system that can claim broader legitimacy.”).
109. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & Pol’y 
107, 130 (1996); Katherine M. Franke, Marriage Is a Mixed Blessing, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2011, at A25, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/24franke.html?_r=0; Tara Siegel Bernard, 
Some Companies Want Gays to Wed to Get Health Benefits, N.Y. Times, July 9, 2011, at B1, available at 
http://nyti.ms/1l4iE6c.
110. See Ettelbrick, supra note 98, at 25–26 (“If the laws changed tomorrow and lesbians and gay men were 
allowed to marry, where would we find the incentive to continue the progressive movement we have 
started that is pushing for societal and legal recognition of all kinds of family relationships?”); Nancy D. 
Polikoff, The New “Illegitimacy”: Winning Backward in the Protection of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 
Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 721, 722 (2012) (“[P]arentage recognition derived from marriage 
will reduce the urgency of advocating protecting parent-child relationships on more suitable grounds.”); 
Ryan Conrad, Against Equality, in Maine and Everywhere, in Against Equality: Queer Critiques 
of Gay Marriage 43, 48 (Ryan Conrad ed., 2010) (“Once privilege is doled out to middle class gay 
couples, are they going to continue on to fight . . . for comprehensive queer/trans inclusive sex education, 
or to free queers unjustly imprisoned during rabidly homophobic sex-abuse witch hunts? Doubtful is an 
overstatement.”).
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conformists to achieve their goals. Although non-conformists present themselves as 
“equally haughty,” just as the Plain-Belly Sneetches were in the original version of 
the story, in reality non-conformist gays share the insecurities that the 1961 version 
of the Plain-Belly Sneetches had of being left out.
 Assimilationist gays are also drawing distinctions between “good gays” and “bad 
queers” as a way of furthering their legal rights. As Jonathan Rauch, an advocate of 
same-sex marriage, has written:
If gay marriage is recognized, single gay people over a certain age should not 
be surprised when they are disapproved of or pitied. That is a vital part of 
what makes marriage work. It’s stigma as social policy. If marriage is to work 
it cannot be merely a “lifestyle option.” It must be privileged. That is, it must 
be understood to be better, on average, than other ways of living.111
 As with the tensions between heterosexuals and gays and between gays and 
African Americans, Social Dominance Theory also helps to explain many of the 
tensions between assimilationist and non-conformist gays. First, assimilationist gays 
arguably possess many of the characteristics that the theory identifies as associated 
with subordinated groups. By seeking the right to marry, join the military, and the 
like, assimilationists can be perceived by some—correctly or incorrectly—as 
preferring the out-group (the heterosexual majority) to their own group. Second, the 
accusation by non-conformist gays that the assimilationists are merely trying to “ape” 
heterosexuality constitutes the adoption of an oppositional identity,112 akin to the 
accusation that assimilationist African Americans are merely trying to “act White.” 
Third, those assimilationist gays who critique the “lifestyle” of non-conformist gays 
use non-conformist gays as a negative reference group to ensure they are no longer at 
the bottom of the social hierarchy.113
 Like African American opponents of gay rights, both assimilationist and non-
conformist gays internalize the insecurities of the Plain-Belly Sneetches and the 
discriminatory impulses of the Star-Belly Sneetches. For the assimilationist gays, 
111. See Jonathan Rauch, For Better or Worse?, in Same-Sex Marriage: Pro and Con: A Reader 170, 179 
(Andrew Sullivan ed., Vintage Books 2004).
112. See Carpenter, supra note 106, at 808 (“But note how the critique of straight acting, in its rejection of 
performance and straight identity, is itself encouraging a certain performance and constructing an 
identity. It is an oppositional identity, a rejection of everything associated with a world of people you 
imagine hate you.”).
113. Regarding this last point, this would hardly be the first time that assimilationist gays created a negative 
reference group within the broader community of sexual minorities as a means of furthering their own 
interests; indeed, there is a long history of assimilationist gays using transgendered persons as a negative 
reference group. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Civil Rights Reform and the Body, 6 Harv. L. & Pol’y 
Rev. 201, 213 (2012); Katrina C. Rose, Where the Rubber Left the Road: The Use and Misuse of History in 
the Quest for the Federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 18 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 397, 
434 (2009); A Life of Service: An Interview with Mia Yamamoto, 13 Asian Pac. Am. L.J. 1, 19 (2008); 
Elvia R. Arriola, Staying Empowered by Recognizing Our Common Grounds: A Reply to Subordination and 
Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems, by Professor Nancy 
Ehrenreich, 71 UMKC L. Rev. 447, 451–53 (2002); Shannon Minter, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay 
Rights? Getting Real About Transgender Inclusion in the Gay Rights Movement, 17 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. 
Rts. 589, 601–07 (2000).
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these two forces drive them to align themselves more closely with the dominant 
group (heterosexuals) while making non-conformist gays their negative reference 
group. For the non-conformist gays, these two forces drive them to speak about the 
superiority of queer culture to straight culture and oppose the legal developments 
that would make them the out-group vis-à-vis assimilationist gays.
Vi. WhO is sYLVEstEr MCMOnKEY MCbEan?
 As indicated in Part I, in the 1961 version of The Sneetches, Seuss introduced 
readers to Sylvester McMonkey McBean, who played off the weaknesses of the Star-
Belly and Plain-Belly Sneetches by offering to add or remove stars from their 
bellies—for a fee—as a way of eradicating or reemphasizing their differences, and 
consequently the hierarchical scheme. Through the McBean character, The Sneetches 
goes beyond telling a story about the discriminatory impulses and insecurities of 
humans, and “makes a statement about those who have a vested interest in keeping 
people divided and at war.”114
 In the battle over gay rights, who is McBean? While an exhaustive answer to 
that question is beyond the primary scope of this essay, I offer the following 
provocative hypothesis that is worth exploring in a future essay.
 Within the gay rights arena, a professional class of proponents and opponents of 
such rights—lobbyists, politicians, attorneys, advocacy groups, authors, and 
academics—has developed and grown over the years.115 While nearly all entered this 
battle with pure ideological intentions, over time at least some portion of this group has 
come to depend for their collective livelihood and relevance on the continued prejudice 
of the majority coupled with the minority’s need to be included. The professional 
classes that have grown on all sides of this issue depend upon one another—and the 
discriminatory impulses and insecurities of humans—for their perpetuation. Even 
after such organizations serve the purpose that caused them to come into existence, 
they move on to new causes and battles and renew the calls for donations.
 For example, during the 2012 campaign battle over legalizing same-sex marriage 
in Washington State, supporters of legalization would frequently send emails to 
other supporters with ominous warnings about the strength of the opposition, and 
would ask them for three dollars to help fight back,116 an amount ironically 
reminiscent of McBean’s sales pitch to the Plain-Belly Sneetches: “You want stars 
like a Star-Belly Sneetch . . . ? My friends, you can have them for three dollars 
each!”117After the battle for marriage rights in Washington was fought and won, 
114. James W. Kemp, The Gospel According to Dr. Seuss 68 (2004).
115. As an author and academic specializing in sexual orientation and gender identity law, I include myself 
within this group. 
116. See, e.g., E-mail from Zach Silk, Campaign Manager, Wash. United for Marriage (Oct. 6, 2012, 12:47 
EST) (on file with author). 
117. See The Sneetches, supra note 4.
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organizations on either side of the issue did not disband, but instead moved on to 
fight other battles.118
 This is not to cast aspersions on the individuals who have fought these campaigns, 
and who are responsible for many of the important civil rights gains experienced by 
gays in recent years. Rather, it is simply to highlight the fact that one can have both 
benevolent and self-serving motives even when engaged as a professional in such 
altruistic endeavors as the battle for civil rights.
Vii. COnCLUsiOn
 In this essay, I have invoked the universal themes found in Dr. Seuss’s The 
Sneetches as a vehicle for describing the struggle for gay rights in the United States. I 
have demonstrated that in this struggle there has been not only a battle between the 
heterosexual majority and the gay minority, but also sub-battles between the African 
American and gay communities and within the gay community itself.
 I have demonstrated that each of these groups simultaneously internalizes the 
discriminatory impulses of the Star-Belly Sneetches and the insecurities of the Plain-
Belly Sneetches. Relying on the insights of Social Dominance Theory, I have sought 
to demonstrate that The Sneetches is not merely a story about a struggle between 
different classes of people within society, but also about a struggle within each of us 
as individuals. We all seek to improve our standing in the social hierarchy by fighting 
laws created by the majority designed to maintain their superior rank and by 
replicating that social hierarchy vis-à-vis groups whose civil rights battles are in the 
more embryonic stages. I have identified a similar set of dual impulses—altruism 
and self-preservation—for those engaged as professionals in the battle for civil rights. 
Those competing forces do not make us inherently good or bad people, but rather 
help to explain, at least in part, why we act as we do.
 These insights do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that any of the competing 
sides in the battle over gay rights should change their positions. Rather, they provide 
each side with a reason to further reflect upon what may be subconscious motivations 
for its positions as well as its methods of advocacy, and to reconsider both in light of 
those reflections.
118. See, e.g., Michelle Garcia, Washington: Marriage Opponents Take on Surrogacy, Advocate (Dec. 19, 
2012, 6:58 PM ET), http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/2012/12/19/marriage-
opponents-washington-take-surrogacy; E-mail from Equal Rights Wash. to author (Nov. 21, 2012, 
18:56 EST) (on file with author). 
